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Improving Public Services: Public Administration Reform in Northern Ireland 
 
Abstract 
 
The devolved government in Northern Ireland set about the task of putting in place ‘a 
modern and effective system of public administration that can deliver high quality 
public services to our citizens’. It did so through a review of public administration 
launched in June 2002. This paper offers a formative evaluation of the quest to 
improve the quality of public services, now being taken forward by a British minister 
since the suspension of devolution. It argues that the review is being driven by 
institutional concerns and is devoid of a public service modernising agenda. 
Additionally, it contends that how people in Northern Ireland perceive public services 
is contingent on their views on its constitutional status (Direct Rule or devolved 
government) which, in turn, is linked to their support for the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement, rather than the performance of public bodies. As a consequence, the 
reforms may result in little more than institutional tinkering with doubtful impact on 
the quality of public services. 
 
Introduction 
 
The current structure of public administration in Northern Ireland has evolved in a 
piecemeal fashion as a response to the wider political developments in the Province 
since the prorogation of its Parliament (Stormont) in March 1972. That the system of 
public administration should reflect the socio-economic and political milieu, in itself, 
is no surprise. What is different about Northern Ireland is that the abuse of power in 
the execution of public services played a significant part in the demise of devolution 
from 1921-72 and paved the way for a system of public administration so distinctive 
from other parts of the United Kingdom as to earn it the rather dubious title of 'a place 
apart' (Rose, 1971). With the collapse of the Northern Ireland Parliament and the 
subsequent imposition of Direct Rule from Westminster, a system of public 
administration evolved as a short-term expedient until such times as 'solutions' to 
macro constitutional issues could be found.  In the absence of a political settlement, 
temporary administrative arrangements bedded in, described by Bloomfield (1998) 
(former head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service) as a state of 'permanent 
impermanence'. Reflecting on the period since 1972 one politician argued ‘the quality 
of government services in Northern Ireland too often lets down the people who are 
using them and who are paying for them through their taxes. That is in part, although 
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not entirely, a legacy of nearly four decades of violence’ (Lidington, 2004). With a 
major political development to restore a devolved administration in the form of the 
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, participating parties agreed that it was time to take 
stock of the way in which public services are delivered in Northern Ireland through a 
Review of Public Administration. In light of the Review this paper will attempt to do 
3 key things. First, it will describe the complex edifice that is the Northern Ireland 
public sector which has led to charges that it is both over-governed and over-
administered (Carmichael & Osborne, 2003; Knox, 1999). Second, it will 
contextualise and explicate the current reform process and emerging changes 
proposed for the public sector. Third, using attitudinal survey data, it will evaluate 
empirically these proposals against the Minister’s assertion that ‘improving services 
lies at the heart of any new model of public administration for Northern Ireland’.  
 
The current system of public administration 
 
The current system of public administration in Northern Ireland dates back only to 
December 1999 at which point power was devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly 
and its Executive Committee as a result of the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement
2
. Devolution in Northern Ireland is part of the wider constitutional reform 
agenda of the Labour Government which has seen powers devolved to the Scottish 
Parliament, Welsh Assembly, London Assembly and the future possibility of English 
regional assemblies. Devolution itself is seen by the government as integral to a wider 
modernising approach of renewal and reform of public services, the aims of which 
are: to ensure that policy making is more joined up and strategic; public service users, 
not providers, are the focus of activities; and public services are high quality and 
efficient (Cabinet Office, 1999).  Devolved government in Northern Ireland witnessed 
the six pre-existing government departments responsible for public services under 
Direct Rule reconfigured and expanded to ten departments with an additional 
department (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister - OFMDFM) to 
manage the Programme for Government and the agenda of the new Executive. The 
restructuring of departments had no administrative logic but was the outcome of 
political negotiations between the main political parties (but mostly the Ulster 
Unionists and the SDLP) who agreed that the Northern Ireland Executive should 
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 Devolved government in Northern Ireland is currently suspended (at the time of writing, October 
2004) since October 2002. There have been four periods of devolution since the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement: 2
nd
 December 1999 – 11th February 2000; 30th May 2000 – 10th August 2001; 12th August 
2001 – 21st September 2001; and, 23rd September 2001 – 14th October 2002. 
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comprise 12 ministers - six unionists and six nationalists
3
. As Wilson (2001: 74) 
reported, 'the unspoken calculus was that Sinn Féin would not be satisfied with only 
one executive seat; ten departments were required to ensure the party enjoyed two. 
The result was an allocation of ministerial positions as follows: Sinn Féin two, SDLP 
three, Ulster Unionist Party three and Democractic Unionist Party two'. Additionally, 
the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister has two junior ministers. 
These political machinations therefore dictated the current structure of government 
with each department headed by a minister (and OFMDFM two junior ministers). 
Politically-derived administrative changes were not however a completely new 
experience for Northern Ireland. As a former Head of the Civil Service recounts 'in 
1973-74 when departmental structures were last re-examined in the context of 
impending devolution, a major influence was the imperative to find ministerial posts 
capable of accommodating a specific political balance in a coalition context' 
(Bloomfield, 1998: 146). 
 
The eleven government departments are responsible for the bulk of 'transferred' public 
services
4
 and, under devolved government arrangements, are accountable to ministers 
who liaise with their respective statutory committees (for each of the 10 departments). 
The committees are there 'to advise and assist each Northern Ireland Minister in the 
formulation of policy with respect to matters within his/her responsibilities as a 
Minister' (Northern Ireland Act, 1998: section 29). In 2003-4 the total expenditure on 
devolved public services in Northern Ireland is £7.32 billion (see figure 1) with a 
staffing complement of 29,500 civil servants
5
 (OFMDFM, 2004). ‘Next Steps’ 
executive agencies have been established in several of the departments to deliver 
services within a policy and resources framework which sets out policy objectives, 
budgets, specific targets and results to be achieved. Agencies were a direct 'read-
across' from policy developments following the Ibbs Report in Great Britain 
(Efficiency Unit, 1988) which recommended that the work of each government 
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 The Northern Ireland Act 1998: Section 17 states that the First and Deputy First Minister acting 
jointly may determine the number of ministerial offices to be held by Northern Ireland ministers, and 
the functions of each. There must be one such minister for each Northern Ireland department. The 
Assembly, with cross-community support, must approve the determination.  
4
 The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland remains responsible for ‘excepted’ and ‘reserved’ matters. 
Excepted matters are those matters of concern to the United Kingdom as a whole where no local 
variation is possible, such as defence, foreign policy and taxation. Reserved matters are powers that 
have not been transferred to the devolved Assembly but which could be at a later stage, such as 
policing and criminal justice. 
5
 Staffing figures are taken from Equal Opportunities in Northern Civil Service Report (Department of 
Finance and Personnel, May 2003). The figures do not include direct recruits to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, Police Sevice of Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Prison Service. 
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department must be organised in a way which focussed on the job to be done - the 
systems and structures must enhance the effective delivery of policies and services. 
There are 18 executive agencies
6
 ranging from the Water Service which has a budget 
of almost £250m and over 2,000 staff, to the Public Records Office with a £2.3m 
budget and around 70 staff. Overall some 48% of civil servants work within executive 
agencies of devolved departments (OFMDFM, 2003a).  
Figure 1: Public Expenditure 2003-04
Employment
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Whilst this accounts for those services currently operated by civil service 
departments, the overall administrative edifice for a population of 1.7 million people 
is much more complex. The Northern Ireland public sector is a mosaic of 
departments, agencies, non-departmental public bodies and local government (see 
figure 2). Non-departmental public bodies or quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organisations (quangos) perform key executive and advisory roles in public services 
in Northern Ireland. Quangos are set up to carry out functions that are best delivered 
at arm's length from government. In the case of Northern Ireland however, a number 
of functions ordinarily within the remit of local government in other parts of the 
United Kingdom, were assigned to quangos (following the Macrory Report, 1970). 
Major services such as housing, education and personal social services (the latter as 
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 There are an additional 3 agencies within the Northern Ireland Office: Compensation Agency; 
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an integrated provision with health) are delivered through quangos, many of which 
report to boards whose members are appointed by ministers or departmental civil 
servants. Planning is an Executive Agency in the Department of the Environment. The 
general trend toward quasi-government organisations is criticised by Weir (1995: 320) 
who argued 'in area after area of public life, elected government  is being replaced by 
appointive government. Those who are elected count for ever less; those who are 
appointed count for ever more'. In an period of Direct Rule from Westminster the 
burgeoning number of quangos merely served to compound the democratic deficit in 
Northern Ireland. At March 2003 there were 2,061 public appointments to 99 public 
bodies (Central Appointments Unit, 2003). These range across the following bodies:  
 
 Executive non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) which carry out 
administrative, regulatory, executive or commercial functions (e.g. education and 
library boards; health trusts; health and social services boards; fire authority). 
 Advisory NDPBs which provide independent, expert advice to Ministers and 
officials (e.g. Historic Building Council; Law Reform Advisory Committee; NI 
Water Council) 
 Tribunals which have semi-judicial functions (e.g. Office of Industrial Tribunals; 
Planning Appeals Commission 
 Other bodies (e.g. Northern  Ireland Transport Holding Company; Rural 
Development Council; Registered Housing Associations) 
 Boards of visitors to penal institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Forensic Science Agency; and the Prison Service 
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The system of appointment to these bodies has been the subject of review, and 
procedures now conform to 7 principles: ministerial responsibility; merit; independent 
scrutiny; equal opportunities; probity; openness and transparency; and proportionality. 
A Commissioner for Public Appointments (NI) conducts an annual audit to ensure 
compliance with these principles. This, however, does little to dispel public 
perceptions that a gravy train of quangocrats, comprising politically acceptable 
nominees, are responsible for a large amount of public expenditure in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
Local government in Northern Ireland is the poor relation in the public sector and 
plays a relatively minor role in public service provision. This is a direct consequence 
of their abuse of powers during the Stormont era (1921-72). Typically, the role played 
by local authorities in the allocation of public housing and the imbalance in the senior 
ranks of public sector (local government and the civil service) gave rise inter alia to 
charges of deliberate bias against Catholics. Darby's (1976: 78) conclusion on the 
period that there was 'a consistent and irrefutable pattern of deliberate discrimination 
against Catholics' is supported by Whyte who argued that 'the most serious charge 
against the Northern Ireland government is not that it was directly responsible for 
widespread discrimination, but that it allowed discrimination on such a scale over a 
substantial segment of Northern Ireland' (Whyte, 1983: 31). Local authorities were 
therefore stripped of their powers. Since 1973 the 26 single tier authorities are elected 
every 4 years by STV proportional representation and spend around £340m annually 
or 4.4% of the public budget (Department of the Environment, 2003). Local councils 
Northern Ireland Assembly 
Executive Committee Departmental Committees 
North/South Ministerial Council 
British-Irish Governmental Council Civic Forum 
British – Irish Council 
11 Government Departments 
18 Next Steps Agencies 53 Executive NDPBs 
11 Tribunals 21 Advisory NDPBs 
8 Cross Border Bodies 18 Health & Social Services Trusts 
26 Local Authorities Others: charities, housing assoc. etc 
Figure 2: The Northern Ireland Public Sector 
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have three main roles: an executive role in which they provide certain regulatory 
services (e.g. building regulations, environmental health) and a limited range of 
functions such as street cleaning, refuse collection, cemeteries and crematoria, 
recreation and tourist amenities and economic development; a representative role 
where members are nominated to serve on area boards (e.g. education and library 
boards); and a consultative role where councils' views are sought on centrally 
provided services such as planning, roads, water and housing. Despite their limited 
range of powers, councils have been successful advocates in brokering the disjointed 
services of other public sector bodies for the benefit of their areas. Importantly, for 
successive periods of Direct Rule, local government remained the only democratic 
forum in Northern Ireland and led the way in promoting power-sharing between the 
main political parties before the principles of proportionality and cross community 
consent were embedded in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and the workings of 
the Assembly.  
 
In sum, the administrative arrangements for a small population are complex, hugely 
bureaucratic and confusing to the public. One observer recently described the 
infrastructure of the Northern Ireland state apparatus as ‘bloated, unwieldly and not fit 
for purpose’. He argued ‘it is more collectivist than Stalinist Russia, more corporatist 
than Mussolini’s Italy and more quangoised than the Britain of two Harolds’ (Smith, 
2004: 67). An eloquent, if over-the-top, description containing, nonetheless, a 
modicum of truth.  
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The context for reform 
 
A number of contextual factors had an important bearing on the impetus for the 
Review of Public Administration. The most obvious change driver was devolution in 
Northern Ireland which followed the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 1998 and the 
establishment of an elected Assembly and Executive. When the powers of 
government were devolved on 2
nd
 December 1999 to local members of the legislative 
assembly (MLAs), one of their priorities was to reform and modernise public services, 
a policy consistent with the Westminster modernisation agenda. The Northern Ireland 
reform agenda has three main foci: investing in the infrastructure needed to deliver 
public services; improving public services; and a Review of Public Administration to 
look at who provides services, the way they are provided, and how effectively they 
meet the needs of the citizen (Northern Ireland Executive, 2002). The (then) First 
Minister noted in an Assembly debate: 
 
 The Review of Public Administration is one of the major tasks facing the 
Executive and will be central to the way in which we deliver, structure and 
organise our public services in the future. This is an opportunity of a 
generation to put in place a modern, accountable, effective system of public 
administration that can deliver a high quality set of public services to our 
citizens (Trimble, 2002: 371). 
 
There was agreement amongst politicians that the plethora and complexity of public 
bodies inevitably resulted in Northern Ireland being over-administered, if not over-
governed, with 3 MEPs, 18 MPs, 108 MLAs and 582 councillors. Importantly 
however, the First Minister was reluctant to upset the administrative architecture so 
carefully negotiated to achieve a power-sharing Executive. Hence non-departmental 
public bodies, local government and ‘Next Steps’ Agencies are part of the Review but 
the 11 government departments have been ruled out. The official rather abstruse 
position is 'the Review is likely to have implications for the functions exercised by the 
Executive, but the institutions established by the Agreement and the division of 
functions between the 11 departments will not be part of the Review's remit' 
(OFMDFM: 2002). With this important omission, the terms of reference for the 
Review, launched in June 2002, are:  
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To review the existing arrangements for accountability, administration and 
delivery of public services in Northern Ireland, and to bring forward options 
for reform which are consistent with the arrangements and principles of the 
Belfast Agreement, within an appropriate framework of political and financial 
accountability (Review of Public Administration, 2002).  
 
The Review is being led by a multi-disciplinary team of officials in the Office of the 
Minister and Deputy First Minister, working with the advice of a team of independent 
experts. Whilst most politicians welcomed the Review, there were notable exceptions. 
Robert McCartney (UK Unionist, MLA) argued strongly against the exclusion of the 
11 government departments criticising this as a means of shoring up the Northern 
Ireland Executive. 'Under the d'Hondt system, the four main parties that provide the 
10 ministers have a vested interest in continuing as before.. there is no effective 
opposition, no joined-up government and no Cabinet responsibility. There are 10 
independent warlordships' (McCartney, 2002). There were also criticisms of the fact 
that the Review was being led by civil servants in the Office of the First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister reporting to a subcommittee of the Executive. Characterising 
civil servants as 'budget maximising bureaucrats' (Dunleavy, 1991) in a rhetorical 
question, McCartney continued 'officials will have a vested interest in keeping their 
own administrative empires going - who has ever heard of a civil servant who has 
been anxious to reduce the number beneath him (sic) in the pyramid?' There is 
empirical support for this view expressed by Grindle (2001:31) who found in other 
reform studies that the organisation of service delivery was of little interest to users or 
citizens. Reform, he claimed, is generally an elite process 'it is not public demands, 
the legislature or interest groups that define reform initiatives but small groups located 
in the executive'.  
 
The (Direct Rule) Minister now responsible for overseeing the Review has noted that 
'improving services to the public lies at the heart of any new model of public 
administration' (Pearson, 2004a). There is an acknowledgement that the 'reform 
process is not an end in itself and is only of value if it results in measurably better 
services for the public that deliver real value for money' (OFMDFM, 2004: 89).  
 
The Review Team has been charged with fulfilling the following 10 characteristics in 
making recommendations for change: 
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1. Democratic accountability: to ensure the democratic oversight by elected 
representatives of services provided within their area of responsibility and 
holding to account those delivering other services not directly within their 
remit. 
2. Community responsiveness: to make services responsive to local needs and 
variations in those needs. 
3. Cross-community concerns: to protect the concerns of communities which are 
in a minority in different parts of Northern Ireland, in terms of delivery and 
accountability of public services and ensuring proper protection of their 
interests. 
4. Equality and human rights, including equity of access: to provide and deliver 
services fairly throughout Northern Ieland so that any new arrangements from 
the Review comply with equality and human rights legislation.  
5. Subsidiarity: to consider which services are best developed, overseen and 
delivered at local level, sub-regional and regional levels and the co-ordination 
of policy making and service delivery across these levels. 
6. Quality of Service: to ensure that services are delivered as efficiently and 
effectively as possible to certain quality standards.  
7. Co-ordination and integration of services: to examine the potential for co-
operation between different types of services to deliver cross-cutting policies. 
8. Scope of the public sector: to assess the appropriateness of services being 
provided by the public sector and the role of the private and 
community/voluntary sector in contributing to better public services.  
9. Efficiency and effectiveness: to consider the best use of resources so that any 
reorganisation creates the most effective and efficient services to the public, 
avoiding duplication, minimising managerial and bureaucratic expenditure and 
maximising spending on front-line services. 
10. Innovation and business organisation: to be forward-looking by examining the 
needs of people in 5-10 years time through opportunities arising from new 
technology and better ways of delivering services. 
(Adapted from Review of Public Administration, 2002). 
The original timescale for the Review (launched in June 2002) was an interim report, 
following consultation, to the Northern Ireland Executive by Spring 2003 and final 
recommendations on a preferred model by the end of 2003. All of this assumed the 
continuance of devolved government with the Northern Ireland Executive taking 
ownership of this key policy development. Devolution, however, has been 
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intermittent and faltering
7
 plagued by a series of incidents giving rise to the lack of 
trust between the political parties and loss of confidence in the outworkings of the 
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement amongst unionists. With the Assembly now in 
suspension for fourth time since October 2002, the Secretary of State, whilst 
acknowledging that the key decisions should be taken by the devolved government, 
has continued to progress the work of the Review consulting with the main political 
parties as necessary. The government intends to produce a ‘firm proposals document’ 
for consultation in Autumn 2004 with a view to legislating on changes in Spring 2005 
and an implementation date in time for the local government elections of 2009. 
 
Progress Report 
 
What have been the keys outputs from the Review thus far? The Review Team has 
been industrious. It has engaged in widespread consultation and research broadly 
categorised as: public attitude surveys on their experiences of government services; 
study visits to other jurisdictions (Europe, North America, Australia and New 
Zealand) which examined how public services were structured and delivered; 
qualitative (focus group) engagement with key stakeholders (general public; providers 
and users of public services; and public sector staff); organisational mapping of the 
public sector; and briefing papers on key issues in public administration. The findings 
from the above work informed a consultation paper launched in October 2003 which 
set out five possible models for consideration in rethinking the structural architecture 
of public services. 
 
                                                          
7
 There have been 4 periods of devolution in Northern Ireland since the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement: 2
nd
 December 1999 - 11
th
 February 2000; 30
th
 May 2000 - 10
th
 August 2001; 12
th
 August 
2001 - 21
st
 September 2001; and 23
rd
 September 2001 - 14
th
 October 2002. 
 13 
1. Status Quo: This model envisages no change to the overall structure of public 
administration. 
2. Centralised: Under this model all major services would be delivered directly 
by government departments. 
3. Regional and Sub-Regional Public Bodies: A range of public bodies, operating 
either regionally or sub-regionally, would deliver public services. 
4. Reformed Status Quo with enhanced Local Government: While keeping the 
main features of the current system, local government would be given new 
responsibilities. 
5. Strong Local Government: Major public services would be the responsibility 
of a smaller number of new councils.  
(Review of Public Administration in Northern Ireland, 2003: 25-29). 
 
The consultation ended in February 2004 and attracted 170 written responses. The 
general points emerging from the responses were: 
 
 There is unanimous support for the need for change and a demand for early action. 
 'Quality of service' is seen as more important than the means by which the service 
is delivered. 
 There is a widespread consensus on the need for fewer public bodies, with more 
collaboration and less fragmentation. 
 There is a preference for models 4 and 5 above with fewer quangos and a smaller 
number of larger councils having more powers. 
 Co-terminosity of administrative boundaries is seen as essential to facilitate 
effective collaboration. 
 There is a recognition that some services are best delivered centrally but there is 
scope for more local delivery than at present. 
 The Assembly, Executive and Departments should be responsible for policy and 
strategic development, as well as monitoring standards, but not for the delivery of 
services. 
 While some aspects of health are best delivered regionally, most services should 
be delivered by sub-regional organisations each serving populations of 
approximately 250,000. 
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 There is a need for fair and robust governance arrangements to ensure transparent 
decision-making and protection of minority interests. 
(Northern Ireland Executive, 2004) 
In light of the consultation findings the (Direct Rule) Minister made his preference 
known for the shape of the final model, due to go out for consultation in Autumn 
2004, by suggesting a two-tier system of regional and sub-regional bodies. At the 
regional level the Assembly and government departments will be responsible for 
policy development, strategic planning, setting standards and monitoring 
performance. Regional authorities and ‘Next Steps’ Agencies will deliver those 
services of province-wide import. At the sub-regional level the emphasis will be on 
service delivery through larger local authorities and sub-regional bodies with council-
led community planning and civic leadership (see figure 3).  
 
SUB-REGIONAL 
 
 
Form: 
Co-terminous boundaries 
Local authorities 
Health bodies 
Other sub regional bodies 
Sub-regional delivery units 
 
Functions: 
Localised policy role 
Service delivery 
Council-led community 
planning 
Civic leadership 
 
Local representation, consultation and partnership 
Central/local 
relations body 
Community & 
Voluntary Sector 
Private Sector 
Figure 3 
Developing Model of Public Administration 
REGIONAL TIER 
 
Form: 
NI Assembly & Executive 
Civil Service Departments 
Regional Authorities 
Next Steps Agencies 
 
 
 
Functions: 
Policy development 
Strategic planning 
Standards 
Regional services delivery 
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The Minister commented 'it is clearly evident that people want the Review to move 
ahead without delay, that improving the quality of public services should be the prime 
consideration for reform, and that there are too many public bodies at present and a 
lack of effective co-ordination and collaboration between service providers' (Pearson, 
2004b).  He summarised the likely detail of his final model thus: 
 
- a significant reduction in the number of public bodies, including health service 
bodies; 
- the reduction in the number of councils from 26 to between five and eight more 
powerful councils which could have responsibilities for an increased range of 
functions such as regeneration, environmental services, some planning functions 
and local roads, delivered within administrative boundaries which are aligned with 
other service providers; 
- arrangements at local level to safeguard the maintenance of local identity and 
community input to decision-making; and 
- robust governance arrangements to ensure transparent decision-making, fairness 
and the protection of minority rights.  
 
Evaluating the proposed reforms 
 
Toonen (2003) argues that administrative reform as a process is best conceived of as 
somewhere on a continuum between planned change on the one hand and emerging 
incremental strategy on the other. Whilst reform is often presented as the outcome of 
a planned approach, in practice however the process of consultation and negotiation 
among the institutional and administrative interests turns grand stated ambitions into 
modest changes. He suggests: 
 
Reform is best conceived of as a long-term, less rationally designed, 
piecemeal and cyclical process. A process that is full of inconsistencies, and 
self-induced consequences, but also with expected serendipities, which, in the 
long run, may actually generate some decent results, next to the misses 
inherent to any experimental and learning processes (Toonen, 2003: 473).  
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Importantly he goes on to argue that whilst economic pressures in the 1970s and 
1980s forced governments in the Western world into a series of institutional and 
budgetary reforms we should not disregard the importance of politics, ideology and 
leadership. 'Politics matters in administrative reform, particularly in terms of 
politically framing the problem, timing the initiatives and setting the reform agenda' 
(Toonen, 2003:474). Yet, none of the characteristics for reforms make reference to 
political influences on the outcomes of the Review. Despite the absence of devolution, 
local political parties must be satisfied with (or at least acquiesce in) the outcomes of 
the Review, hence the Minister’s desire for regular briefings. Thus far, given the 
Minister’s preference for fewer councils, some political parties are promoting the idea 
of 18 local authorities based on Westminster boundaries. This, of course, makes the 
political calculus simple and the number of unionist/nationalist controlled councils 
relatively easy to predict. The Minister is also anticipating the restoration of 
devolution, at which point local MLAs must assume ownership of his proposals and 
implement the necessary changes. 
 
According to Frost (2002), reforming the organisational structure of the public service 
is a key strategy in improving efficiency within government. Restructuring seeks to 
address three concerns, that: policy makers have become distanced from the public; 
the public service has become inflexible; and the public service has become 
inefficient. He argues that a key challenge is that boundaries are no longer clear with 
the increasing varieties of operating or executive agencies. As a consequence the 
traditional lines between the public service and the broader public sector are now 
harder to trace. A second and related challenge, he suggests, concerns the attraction of 
the one-off 'big-fix' solution to public service shortcomings: 
 
Changing organisational structures can, at some considerable human and 
financial cost, address structural problems. If the problems are more directly 
related to managerial practices and support systems, or to weak or uncertain 
ethical frameworks, structural solutions are an expensive method for 
answering the wrong question (Frost, 2002: 90). 
 
This highlights one systemic flaw in the Northern Ireland Review of Public 
Administration – its emphasis on structural reorganisation. The review is being hailed 
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as a means of improving the quality of public services. But it is doing so in the 
absence of a modernising agenda. Key policy initiatives in the rest of the United 
Kingdom such as Modernising Government (1999), Reforming our Public Services - 
Principles into Practice (2002) and the most recent policy debate contained in The 
Future of Local Government: Developing a 10 year Vision (2004) have all but 
bypassed Northern Ireland. This is exemplified by the public service agreement for 
the Public Service Reform Unit in Northern Ireland whose key target is 'to ensure 
through the Freedom of Information Act, rights of access to information by January 
2005' (OFMDFM, 2004: 137). Hardly core to improving public services!  
 
Parallel concerns about institutional restructuring have been expressed in New 
Zealand, regarded as an international model of public services reform. Evidence of 
efficiency gains have been crowded out by unease over restructuring. Shaw (2000: 
275) argued that organisational change ‘saps morale and loyalty, drains institutional 
wisdom and experience, and deflects the attention of public servants away from their 
primary responsibilities to citizens’. In short, reorganisation becomes an end in itself 
for public servants pre-occupied with their vested career interests. 
 
The literature on public service reform is dominated by the extent to which countries 
have embraced the elements of new public management - budgetary reforms, 
marketisation and privatisation, efficiency and effectiveness, decentralisation and a 
customer orientation (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie, 
2002; Lynn, 2003). In Northern Ireland the reform agenda appears entirely 
institutional in nature. Such managerial reform as has taken place is through a process 
of 'read-across' from the Great Britain rather than a dedicated public service reform 
agenda. According to Batley (2004) reform entails more than restructuring 
institutions. It is not, he claims ‘just a technical matter of finding the best design 
solution and applying it…nor is reform only a narrowly political process of 
confronting specific interests.. it is a more complex reality where political and 
administrative arrangements embody values, behaviour and structures of power’ 
(Batley, 2004: 36). 
 
By way of a formative evaluation of the proposed changes, a number of specific 
observations can be made. First, concern has been expressed that the Review has 
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become a review of local government rather than public administration in its widest 
sense. This perception has been fuelled by the Minister's early (some have suggested 
premature) declaration that the number of councils will reduce from 26 to 5 - 8 local 
authorities with greater powers.  His early pronouncements also contravene the 
principle that 'form' should follow 'functions' - agree what functions each tier of 
government should deliver and develop a structural model which best fits the 
functional split. The Minister has made imprecise references to functions which larger 
councils 'could have responsibility for' but, in advance of the final consultation round, 
has already predetermined (within narrow limits) the structural configuration of local 
government in the future.  
 
Second, the focus on local government as the most visible manifestation of public 
service deliverers draws attention away from other significant public administration 
players. The 'Next Steps' Agencies for example, employing 48% of the civil service, 
receive no mention in any future reform plans. It is conspicuous that none of the 18 
agencies even responded to the first consultation document although they are clearly 
within the remit of the Review, adding credence to the view that this is a review of 
local government. This is either a puzzling oversight on their behalf or part of an 
accepted wisdom that any Review will not meddle with the machinery of central 
government. If, for example, the functions of the 4 key agencies within the 
Department of the Environment
8
 were to be relocated, its raison d'être would be in 
serious doubt. The same could be said of the Department for Regional Development 
where the removal of the functions of its 2 major agencies
9
 would leave the 
department as a hollow shell.  
 
Third, the need for administrative reform in Northern Ireland has a focal point around 
the issue of quangos or non-departmental public bodies. Pre-devolution, quangos had 
been an attractive option for Direct Rule Ministers. The presence of a powerless local 
government forum, the need for government to distance itself from functions such as 
housing which had been tarnished by sectarian malpractice, and the usefulness of 
strengthening participative democracy through nominees on quangos in a Province 
                                                          
8
 The 4 agencies in the Department of the Environment are: Planning Service; Driver and Vehicle 
Licensing Agency; Environment and Heritage Service; and, Driver and Vehicle Testing Agency. 
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with a democractic deficit (Direct Rule from Westminster) created circumstances 
where quangos flourished. Post-devolution, representative democracy was in the 
ascendancy and MLAs flexed their combined political muscle to dismantle quasi-
government seeing the Review of Public Administration as the means of so doing. 
Such expectations need to be dampened from the experience elsewhere. In Wales, for 
example, the Welsh Development Agency, Education and Training Body (ELWa), 
and the Wales Tourist Board will be abolished from April 2006 and their staff and 
functions absorbed into the Assembly Government civil service. These three bodies 
represent ‘some two-thirds of quangoland’ according to First Minister Rhodri Morgan 
(Osmond, 2004: 2). In Scotland, where a similar exercise took place radical intentions 
to reform quangos did not result in the expected cull. As one observer of the Scottish 
case noted 'for those hoping for an end to quangos following devolution there is 
disappointment. Though bonfires were promised, as institutions NDPBs have proven 
to be remarkably flame-resistant' (Orr, 2003: 167). What resulted was described by 
the Scottish Executive as a 'timely tidying-up, modernising exercise' (Scottish 
Executive, 2001:2, cited by Orr). These may be prophetic words for Northern 
Ireland's reformers. 
 
Fourth, there are concerns that the move to reduce the number of local authorities to 5 
- 8 will significantly impact on the sense of locality upon which the current 26 
principal towns/cities and associated councils are predicated. The sense of place is 
strong in Northern Ireland and local councillors, despite their lack of responsibility for 
major public services, have been the first port of call for constituents in need of help 
and advice. Even with the devolved Assembly and Executive (since 1999), recent 
evidence shows that councillors are contacted much more regularly than MLAs or 
MPs (O'Brien, 2003). Although the Minister has flagged the issue of local identity as 
an issue for the final consultation paper in the Review, there appears to be little 
appetite amongst existing local authorities for a lower symbolic tier of community 
councils whose primary role would be advocacy. Equally, the Review Team is against 
proposing a two-tier system of local government when their primary purpose is to cut 
an over-administered system of public administration.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9
 The 2 key agencies in the Department for Regional Development are the Water Service and the Roads 
Service. 
 20 
Fifth, any proposals for a strong local government also call into question its role vis-à-
vis the Assembly. The proposed central/local split (see figure 3 above) envisages the 
Assembly responsible for policy development and strategic planning, and councils as 
sub-regional services deliverers. Importantly, councils are likely to play a key role in 
other functions which might not fall within their remit such as health, education and 
housing - through new powers of 'well-being' and the democratisation of bodies 
charged with the delivery of these functions.  This places local government in a 
powerful functional role, one whose significance may be more obvious to electors 
than the Northern Ireland Assembly. Currently almost two-thirds of members of the 
Assembly are also local councillors (69 councillors within the108 MLAs) raising 
questions about whether there is a need for this number of MLAs to represent 1.7m 
population. By way of comparison there are 129 Members of the Scottish Parliament 
(population 5.05m) and 60 Welsh Assembly Members (population 2.92m)
10
. Scotland 
and Wales also have more traditional local government systems. 
 
On what basis will the outcomes of the Review be judged? Clearly, the final model 
must meet its terms of reference which emphasise that the reforms should be 
'consistent with the arrangements and principles of the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement and within an appropriate framework of political and financial 
accountability'. These terms are broadly cast and sufficiently nebulous (what does 
'appropriate framework' mean?) to claim most outcomes fulfil the brief. What will be 
more difficult to realize however are the 10 characteristics of the Review. There is no 
ranking associated with these characteristics and hence the assumption must be that 
they are all equally important. Moreover, there is no acceptance that some may 
incongruous. For example, Review proposals which promote cross-community 
concerns must acknowledge that Northern Ireland is an increasingly polarised society. 
Typically in the public housing sector over 70% of housing estates are more than 90% 
Protestant or Catholic (OFMDFM, 2003b). The consequences of this acute 
segregation are the financial costs of duplicating public services for each of the 
communities due to low inter-community mobility and the additional costs of 
addressing sectarianism. As one research report noted: 
 
                                                          
10
 In Northern Ireland there is one MLA per 15,740 population; in Scotland one MSP per 39,150 
people; and in Wales Assembly Member per 48,700 population. 
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The divided community within Northern Ireland creates an environment where 
provision of public services is more expensive and additional community 
relations services are required. These additional costs span a large number of 
departments and range from programmes introduced to break down social 
barriers between communities to additional expenditure required to attract 
visitors to the region (Harbison, 2002: Appendix 6:58). 
 
Hence to meet the Review's characteristic of protecting minority communities seems 
incompatible with their goals of 'efficiency and effectiveness' where they explicitly 
refer to 'avoiding duplication of services'. Other potential anomalies include the 
impact of attempts to operationalise the principle of subsidiarity on the efficiency of 
public service provision, particularly economies of scale. Despite their goal of co-
ordinated and integrated services there may well be problems in joined-up provision 
between the regional services (through the Assembly), sub-regional services (through 
councils), other sub-regional services (through health, housing bodies) and a rump of 
non-departmental public bodies which may remained untouched by the reforms (such 
as the Northern Ireland Housing Executive).   
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Improved public services? 
 
Ultimately the Review of Public Administration must demonstrate that ‘it results in 
measurably better services for the public that deliver real value for money’ 
(OFMDFM, 2004: 89). This is a useful touchstone for the Review but a tall order, not 
least because of definitional issues as to what constitutes ‘better services’ which 
deliver ‘real value for money’. We can examine current public attitudes to service 
provision from baseline information, drawing on two sets of survey data - the 
Northern Ireland Omnibus Survey (2002: n = 1,203) and the Northern Ireland Life 
and Times Survey (2003: n = 1,800)
11
. The data show that 45% of respondents were 
satisfied or very satisfied with public services in Northern Ireland; 20% stated they 
were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied; and 34% reported they were neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied (see figure 4). 
Survey respondents were further asked whether education, health and the economy 
had ‘got better’, ‘worse’, or ‘stayed the same’ under the last Northern Ireland 
Assembly (23
rd
 September 2001 to 14
th
 October 2002), and since the suspension of 
the Assembly (Direct Rule). The results are set out in table 1
12
. 
                                                          
11
 The Northern Ireland Omnibus Survey (2002) questions were commissioned by the Review of Public 
Administration. Data were gathered using probability sampling from 1,203 respondents face-to-face 
across Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (2003) involved 1,800 face-to-
face interviews from randomly selected respondents throughout Northern Ireland. 
12
 Figures exclude ‘don’t know’ and ‘other answer’.  
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Table 1: Public Services – devolution and direct rule 
 
 Education % Health % Economy % 
 Devolved 
Government 
Direct 
Rule 
Devolved 
Government 
Direct 
Rule 
Devolved 
Government 
Direct 
Rule 
Better 26.4 7.0 16.3 6.3 24.4 5.8 
Worse 16.3 13.2 34.9 24.8 18.7 19.3 
Same 57.4 79.8 48.7 68.9 57.0 74.9 
 
Considering one of these services (the economy) in more detail demonstrates a 
significant difference in performance under devolved government and direct rule 
arrangements (see figure 5). The results can be compared with service improvements 
in other devolved regions of the United Kingdom which have been relatively low. For 
example, in Scotland and Wales, 23% and 24% of survey respondents felt standards 
had improved in the National Health Service; 27% and 30% in education; 30% and 
31% in the general standard of living, respectively (Jeffery, 2004). 
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Figure 5
0
20
40
60
80
Better Worse Same
Economy
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
Devolution
Direct Rule
 
 24 
Using Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test we compared the two types of 
administration (Direct Rule and devolution)
13
. The results are shown in tables 2 & 3 
and illustrate a significant improvement in the economy and education under 
devolved government but no significant difference in health services (see table 3 for 
significance levels). 
 
Table 2: Direct Rule and Devolution 
Comparing Education, Health and the Economy 
 
  N Mean 
Rank 
Sum of Ranks 
Education under Direct 
Rule 
 
Education under 
devolution 
Negative ranks 
Positive ranks 
Ties 
Total 
386
a 
194
b 
893
c 
1473
 
294.34 
282.86 
113616.00 
54874.00 
 
Health under Direct Rule 
 
Health under devolution 
Negative ranks 
Positive ranks 
Ties 
Total 
283
d 
305
e 
986
f 
1574
 
304.41 
285.30 
86148.00 
87018.00 
 
The economy under 
Direct Rule 
 
The economy under 
devolution 
Negative ranks 
Positive ranks 
Ties 
Total 
370
g 
162
h 
998
i 
1530
 
279.24 
237.41 
103317.00 
38461.00 
 
 
a. Education under direct rule < education under devolution 
b. Education under direct rule > education under devolution 
c. Education under devolution = education under direct rule 
d. Health under direct rule <  health under devolution 
e. Health under direct rule > health under devolution 
f. Health under devolution = health under direct rule 
g. The economy under direct rule < the economy under devolution 
h. The economy under direct rule > the economy under devolution 
i. The economy under devolution = the economy under direct rule 
 
                                                          
13
 This test takes account of the size of the differences between two sets of related scores (people’s 
opinions on education, health and the economy under devolution and direct rule) by ranking and then 
summing those with the same sign. If there are no differences between the two samples, then the 
number of positive signs should be similar to that of the negative ones (see for example table 2: 
negative and positive ranks for health). 
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Table 3: Differences across Education, Health and the Economy 
Test Statistics
c 
 
 Education under 
direct rule - 
education under 
devolution 
Health under direct 
rule - 
health under 
devolution 
The economy 
under direct rule - 
the economy under 
devolution 
Z -7.860
a 
-.114
b 
-9.764
a 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .910 .000 
 
a. Based on positive ranks 
b. Based on negative ranks 
c. Wilcoxon signed ranks tests 
 
What is surprising about the results is that the public’s experiences of these services 
might suggest a rather different picture. Far from devolved government being a model 
of service excellence it was dogged by controversy. In health, for example, a 
protracted and unresolved debate over the rationalisation of acute hospitals in 
Northern Ireland was passed to Direct Rule Minister, Des Browne, who took the 
decision that quality of health care must take precedence over access and reduced the 
number of acute hospitals from 15 to 9 (with the addition of a new acute hospital in 
Enniskillen). Minister Bairbre de Brún had procrastinated over the decision, not least 
because the site for a new facility involved two Sinn Féin MPs battling it out for its 
location in each of their constituencies. Similarly, a decision on the site for a new 
centralised maternity unit in Belfast had to be taken by Direct Rule Minister, Angela 
Smith, as political controversy raged over its location. Bairbre de Brún's preferred 
venue at the Royal Victoria Hospital (in her West Belfast constituency) was selected, 
much to the chagrin of unionists. The devolved Sinn Féin minister also faced huge 
pressure over increased waiting lists. During her tenure Northern Ireland acquired the 
unenviable reputation of having the longest waiting list (60,000) per capita in Europe, 
now reduced during Direct Rule (at March 2004) to 50,000 (Department of Health, 
Social Services and Public Safety, 2004). 
 
In education, Sinn Féin Minister Martin McGuinness, following a review of the 
education selection system regulated by transfer tests in the last year of primary 
schooling (the so-called '11-plus'), unilaterally announced its abolition as one of the 
final acts of the devolved administration in October 2002. Direct Rule Minister Jane 
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Kennedy was left to pick up the pieces of the proposed new system based on 
'informed parental choice' through 'pupil profiles', and although the timescale for 
abolition has slipped considerable, the intention is still to end the current system of 
academic selection. Mr McGuinness also stopped the publication of school league 
tables under his tenure. In higher education the SDLP Minister, Sean Farren, pushed 
through the introduction of student fees against the advice of his statutory committee 
which advocated the Scottish model of abolishing up-front fees, introducing bursaries 
and establishing an income-contingent graduate endowment (Osborne, 2002). 
 
The fact that the public records a significant improvement (or no significant 
difference) in key public services under devolved government in the face of these 
(selective) issues might suggest an association between service provision and 
constitutional arrangements. Since support for devolution (and its sine qua non, the 
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement) is now ebbing away within the unionist population, 
accelerated by the IRA's intransigence on decommissioning, their attitudes to public 
services may well be conditioned by their increasing dissatisfaction with the 
outworkings of the Agreement. In short, it might be argued that how people perceive 
public services is contingent on their views on the constitutional arrangements (Direct 
Rule/devolved government) which, in turn, are linked to the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement rather than the performance of delivery agents (central government 
departments/agencies, local government and non-departmental public bodies). 
 
We examine this association between the following variables
14
 using logit analysis. 
Logit analysis is a regression style causal analysis and we test whether people’s 
opinions on education, health and the economy are affected by their religion, attitude 
to the Northern Ireland Assembly, and support for the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement. 
 
                                                          
14
 All the variables in the analysis were recoded to exclude categories such as 'don't know', 'other', 'not 
registered to vote' and 'refused'. 
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Dependent variable:  
 Education (deveduc) - respondent's opinion on whether education has 'got better', 
'worse' or 'stayed the same' under the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
 
Factors:  
 Northern Ireland Assembly (niabol) - respondent's opinion on whether he/she 
would be 'pleased', 'sorry' or 'wouldn't mind either way' if the Northern Ireland 
Assembly were to be abolished and Northern Ireland returned to Direct Rule. 
 Support for the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (votegfa) - how respondent's 
would vote on the Good Friday Agreement if it were held today: 'yes', 'no' or 
'wouldn't vote'.  
 Religion of respondent (religcat) - respondent's religion categorised as 'Catholic', 
'Protestant' or 'no religion'.  
 
We repeat this analysis using health and the economy as the dependent variables
15
. 
 
Results: 
Model 1 (Education) has a chi-square likelihood ratio 2 (16) = 15.4, p = .50 
Model 2 (Health) has a chi-square likelihood ratio 2 (16) = 14.5, p = .56 
Model 3 (the Economy) has a chi-square likelihood ratio 2 (16) = 10.6, p = .83 
 
All 3 models produce a 'good fit' to the data. Model 3, for example, suggests there is 
at least an 83% chance that any difference between the cell frequencies predicted by 
the model and the actual observed cell frequencies could be due to chance only, well 
within the conventional 0.05 cut-off level for a significance test.  
 
We can conclude from the analyses that people's attitudes to public services are 
affected by their community background (religion); support for the Belfast (Good 
Friday) Agreement; and their endorsement of devolution. Examining the observed and 
expected frequencies (and adjusted residuals) in each model suggests that Catholics 
are significantly more likely than Protestants to vote for the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement today; would be sorry to see the abolition of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and a return to Direct Rule; and believe public services have got better 
under devolution. It is perhaps worth noting that because the health and education 
portfolios were held by two Sinn Féin ministers this may have influenced Protestant 
                                                          
15
 The model designs are as follows: 
Model 1: (Education): Constant + deveduc + deveduc*votegfa*niabol + deveduc*niabol*religcat + 
deveduc*votegfa*religcat 
Model 2: (Health): Constant + devheal + devheal*votegfa*niabol + devheal*niabol*religcat + 
devheal*votegfa*religcat 
Model 3: (Economy): Constant + devecon + devecon*votegfa*niabol + devecon*niabol*religcat + 
devecon*votegfa*religcat  
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respondents' views on whether these services improved under their stewardship. On 
the other hand, the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment was Sir Reg Empey 
(UUP)  - the model of best fit (p = .83).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Review of Public Administration, due to report on its final model in autumn 
2004, has been described as a 'means to an end'. The 'end' is improved quality of 
public services in Northern Ireland. Yet political influences on both the process (the 
Review) and the product (public services) predominate. In terms of process, the 
parameters of the Review which excluded government departments were politically 
conceived from the beginning. Local politicians weaned on a diet of 'power without 
responsibility' during 30 years of Direct Rule from Westminster stand back while a 
British minister proposes radical reforms to local government, their interest piqued 
only by the political calculus of any new configuration in electoral boundaries.  
 
In terms of product, of the Review promises an improvement in public services. But 
crucially the link between service quality and electoral accountability is missing in 
Northern Ireland, eclipsed by constitutional politics. People in Northern Ireland vote 
along unionist/nationalist cleavages, regardless of service provision. Hence, whilst the 
ten rational characteristics established as the benchmark for the final reform model are 
laudable, they will count for little in the face of an agenda dictated by 'high' politics 
and judged accordingly by the public. The public’s perceptions of service quality are a 
commentary on devolution, the peace process, the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, 
and perhaps even the political affiliation of the Minister. Ultimately it is not the 
Review of Public Administration which will deliver improved public services but a 
system of devolved government in which the public hold to account the Northern 
Ireland Assembly on their performance and delivery of core functions, driven by a 
modernising agenda the absence of which is conspicuous.  
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